Abstract-Hash functions are the swiss army knife of cryptographers. They are used to generate unique identifiers in hash-and-sign signatures, as one-way functions for onetime-password, to break the structure of the input in key derivation functions and also for authentications... . We propose a formal analysis of domain extenders for hash functions in the indifferentiability framework. We define a general model for domain extenders and provide a unified proof of their security in the form of a generic reduction theorem. Our general model captures many iterated constructions such as domain extenders, modes of operation of symmetric cryptography such as CBC-MAC or blockciphers based on Feistel networks. Its proof has been carried out using the Computational Indistinguishability Logic of Barthe et al.. The theorem can help designers of hash functions justifying the security of their constructions: they only need to bound the probability of welldefined events. Our model allows to consider many SHA-3 finalists and is instantiated on two well-known constructions, namely Chop-MD and Sponge. Finally, the indifferentiability bounds which we prove are convincing since they match previous proofs and the application of our result on the sponge construction (underlying the Keccak design) highlights the lack of an additional term in the bound provided by Bertoni et al., as was anticipated but not justified by Bresson et al.. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Hash functions are the swiss army knife of cryptographers. They are used to generate unique identifiers in hash-and-sign signatures, as one-way functions for onetime-password, to break the structure of the input in key derivation functions and also for authentications...
Recently, cryptographers have looked carefully at the security of these functions after the breakthrough discovery of differential attacks by Wang et al. on the MD4 family. Moreover, weaknesses in the Merkle-Damgard (MD) mode of operation [1] , [2] , standardly used to design hash functions, have been exposed (see [3] - [5] ). In response to all these attacks, the NIST decided to launch a competition in order to select the new standard SHA-3.
Hash functions are public functions that map arbitrarily long bitstrings to fixed-length bitstrings. To construct a hash function, cryptographers first build a fixed inputlength function f : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n , where n < m, called a compression function. They then increase the input domain to {0, 1} * using a domain extender, a.k.a. a mode of operation. This latter defines the way the compression function f is iterated to obtain a hash construction H f . Some security goals have been defined for H f such as collision, second-preimage or preimage resistance, but they are not sufficient to cover the needs of all applications of hash functions. Indeed, in security proofs of some cryptographic constructions using hash functions, cryptographers would like to model these latter as public random functions: this is the random oracle model (ROM) of [6] . Controversial [7] , the ROM is now superseded by the standard model. However, many practical schemes are only proved in the ROM. To increase confidence in these proofs, Coron et al. [8] propose to take into account the structure of the domain extender by showing a novel security criterion for them: indifferentiability from a random oracle. This notion is strongly inspired from the indifferentiability framework proposed by Maurer et al. [9] , [10] .
Indifferentiability captures the absence of generic adversaries against the domain extender. Informally, it means that there exists a convincing way to mimic the pair hash construction and compression function using a random oracle and a simulator. A nice composition property ensues: if the compression function behaves as a small random oracle, then the hash construction as a whole is safely modeled by a monolithic random oracle within a bigger cryptographic construction. Therefore, the domain extender does not introduce any structural weakness in the whole cryptographic construction. Consequently, and though it needs to be used with caution [11] , indifferentiability from a random oracle proves to be a relevant security criterion. It is worth noticing that it does capture the aforementioned weaknesses in the MD design, which is shown differentiable from a random oracle. Investigating the indifferentiability of new modes of operations proposed during the SHA-3 competition is an important issue.
To prove indifferentiability results, cryptographers need to show that two idealized systems are indistinguishable. The first system captures the real setting: it is built from a random function in place of the compression function and a domain-extender which can query the former to compute its result. The second system is an idealized version of the first one, where the construction is replaced by a big random oracle RO and the compression function by a simulator S. To simulate the random function it replaces, S has access to RO. The main difficulty of the proof is that S should answer queries consistently while it cannot see the queries/answers of the adversary to RO.
Formal Model. As security proofs in general, indifferentiability proofs present a lot of technicalities and are hard to verify. Moreover, the quantifier order in the definition of security yields subtleties [11] that recall those raised in universal composability frameworks as [12] , [13] . Yet, as cornerstones of many other cryptographic designs, hash constructions need strong and trusted security foundations. To achieve this, we believe that confidence in indifferentiability proofs can strongly benefit from a formal treatment.
Our Contribution. We propose to profit from the computational indistinguishability logic CIL proposed in [14] , whose rules are formalized in Coq. We prove a reduction theorem dedicated to indifferentiability of hash constructions in this framework. Our formalization of proofs thus contributes to bridging the gap towards their automated verification. We extend the semantics of [14] with the notion of overlayers, that captures many iterated constructions: domain extenders, modes of operation of symmetric cryptography such as CBC-MAC or blockciphers based on Feistel networks. Our definition allows us to take into account many domain extenders used in the SHA-3 competition such as JH [15] , Keccak [16] , Skein [17] and BLAKE [18] , the EMD transform [19] , HMAC and NMAC modes [20] . It generalizes the generic domain extenders proposed by Bhattacharyya et al. in [21] since it allows post-processing and multiple inner-primitives. Then, we describe a generic simulator and prove directly in CIL a meta-theorem allowing to bound the indifferentiability of constructions from random oracles. To instantiate this theorem, users have to bound some inconsistency events that can happen in the simulator.
We show on two examples that the bounds provided by our theorem are convincing: for the ChopMD solution, we achieve the same result as Maurer and Tessaro in [22] in case of prefix-free padding and a better bound than that of Chang and Nandi in [23] in the general case. Finally, the application of our result on the sponge construction (underlying the Keccak design) highlights the lack of an additional term in the bound provided by Bertoni et al. in [24] , as was anticipated but not justified by Bresson et al. in [25] .
Outline. The next section briefly provides background on CIL, while the generic definition to capture hash designs and a formal definition of their indifferentiability from a random oracle appear in section III. In section IV, we detail the construction of a generic simulator involved in our result. In V, we define characteristic graphs to capture events of bad simulation and state the reduction theorem. Finally, examples of application appear in section VI.
Notations. LISTS. Given a set A, we denote by A * (resp. A + ) the set of finite lists with elements in A (resp. nonempty finite lists). The empty list is denoted by [ ]. [L] n i=m denotes the sublist of L containing elements of L from the m-th to the n-th position. The append to the right of an
Given an indexed set A = (a i ) i∈N , and an index set I, [a i ] i∈I denotes the list of elements a i for i ∈ I. Moreover, dom(L) denotes the set of first components of elements of L, while L(a) is the set of elements of L with first component a.
STRINGS. Given a bitstring w, |w| denotes the length of w. For s ≤ |w|, Last s (w) and First s (w) denote the suffix of w, respectively its prefix, of length s. For 1 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ |w|, w[m, n] denotes the substring of w starting with its m-th bit and ending its n-th bit. The concatenation of two bitstrings x and y is denoted by x||y. A string of length 0 is denoted by λ.
MISCELLANEOUS. x denotes the ceiling of x. We use 1 to denote the unit type. Given a finite set A, distributions on A are denoted D(A); given a ∈ A and d ∈ D(A), the probability of sampling a according to d is denoted by
The uniform distribution over A is denoted by U (A). We write to stand for elements we do not need to name.
II. ORACLE SYSTEMS AND ADVERSARIES

A. Formalization of Oracles and Adversaries
Following [14] , we use oracle systems to describe cryptographic schemes. Informally, an oracle system is composed of a finite list of stateful oracles that can be queried by an adversary. Each oracle has an implementation which is a probabilistic algorithm that may have access to other oracles. A query call to an oracle yields an output, called answer, and may modify the memory as a side effect.
Let n be a positive natural number, for each i = 1, · · · n, M i be a countable set of memories (states) and Figure 1 . Implementations of oracles F and K Definition II.1. An oracle system O is given by: 
A partial execution sequence of S is a sequence η of the form m 0
, then η is an execution sequence of length k. A probabilistic transition system S induces a sub-distribution on executions, denoted S, such that the probability P r[S = η] of a finite execution sequence η is
A transition system is of height k ∈ N if all its executions have length at most k; in this case, S is a distribution. 
An adversary is called bounded, if it is k-bounded for some k. Thus, k bounds the number of oracle calls that can be performed by an adversary. To meaningfully state security properties of oracle systems, we also bound the adversary's global running time. Therefore, we consider bounds of the form (k, t) ∈ (N O → N) × N and talk about (k, t)-bounded adversaries, whose set we denote Adv(k, t).
Security properties abstract away from the state of adversaries, and are modeled using traces. Informally, a trace τ is an execution sequence η from which the adversary memories have been erased. Definition II.5. Let O be an oracle system.
• A partial trace is a sequence τ of the form m 0
The probability of an event is derived directly from the definition of A | O. Indeed, each execution sequence η induces a trace T (η) simply by erasing the adversary memory at each step. Consequently, for each trace τ , we define the set T −1 (τ ) of execution sequences that are erased to τ , and for every event E the probability P r(A|O : E) = P r(A|O : T −1 (E)).
B. The Logic
The logic CIL [14] , [26] , [27] features around twenty sound rules to reason on oracle systems. It is built to establish two kinds of judgments classically used to express concrete security notions and carry out their proofs. Namely, judgments capture that a function of the adversarial resources bounds the indistinguishability between two oracle systems or the probability that an event happens in an oracle system.
Rules of the logic formalize reasoning patterns that generally appear in cryptographic proofs. Rather than simply mimic frequent steps of proofs carried out in the game-based methodology [28] , CIL rules stem from classic programming language and concurrent systems proof techniques, such as bisimulation relations, embedding in a context or determinization. Indeed, the formalism is far more resembling descriptions of security experiments and code-based transformations proposed in [29] than game-based proofs. The fact that it allows to reason on oracle systems and abstracts away adversaries is in particular worth noticing, though it is totally possible to code games as systems. The main focus of the proof system is to build transitions between systems relying on provably correct equalities (or inequalities) between probabilities. Compared to a gamebased pencil-and-paper proof, it often looks like taking smaller steps and the proof outline might get modofied to get a full proof within the proof system. Indeed, some relations between probabilities seem quite obvious but are not so easily proven. The whole purpose of the proof system is to only allow correct transitions. Hence, such situations or sufficient conditions such as bisimulation between programs have been identified and formalized as rules of the proof system. Furthermore, the proof system comprises interface rules allowing for input of results obtained by external reasoning. We elaborate a little on bisimulations and determinization concepts, since they are used in the proof of the result presented in this paper.
Bisimulation relations appear as a key notion to formally link two oracle systems. They are indeed equivalence relations on the memories of the systems and provide an explicit relation between probabilities of classes of partial executions in both systems. Therefore, events compatible with the partition yielded by the equivalence relation happen with equal probability in two bisimilar systems. In practise, unconditional bisimulation may be insufficient. Therefore, CIL uses the notion of bisimulation up to a condition. Oracle system determinization allows to group states and thus partial executions that correspond to the same exchange sequence. As a result, where bisimulation relations fail to formalize anticipation or delay of sampling of some values from one oracle call to another one, determinization successfully capture that such modifications yield behaviors indistinguishable by an adversary.
III. OVERLAYERS AND SECURITY CRITERION
A. Overlayers
Many cryptographic functions are built by iterating a set of inner primitives: hash functions, CBC-MAC, blockciphers... Inner-primitives take as input bitstrings of fixed length. As hash functions take as input longer bitstrings, they are based on so-called domain extenders [1] , [30] . These specify how the input message is split into blocks that can be treated by the inner-primitives.
In [21] , a formal definition for domain extenders is presented. Though applicable to several known constructions, this definition does not capture constructions that include a post-processing function. Post-processing is used to compute the global hash result out of the multiple inner-primitive outputs. We emphasize that post-processing does not perform calls to inner-primitives and that these take place before postprocessing. For example, the ChopMD [8] Figure 2 .
where init sp (x) = m + k − 1, with m = |w|/r and k * r the length of the output of the sponge construction. Besides the limitation mentioned previously, we notice that the case of multiple inner-primitives is not dealt with in [21] . For instance, the Grøstl [32] construction is out of scope of this definition. Hence, we introduce a new definition based on the notion of overlayer that allows to capture all hash functions based on domain extenders we are aware of. A hash design can then be described as an overlayer applied to an oracle system, where this latter defines the inner-primitives. Informally, an overlayer consists in:
1) a function Θ that describes how an input x is padded and cut into init( 
, where:
) the input transformation and r > 0 the block length. • functions [1,init(x) ] is the list of exchanges generated by the H j functions for x and y = a piv(x) . EXAMPLE III.3. Consider again the sponge construction. Then, the pivot is piv sp (x) = m,
We require overlayers to satisfy the following conditions that are met by all hash designs we know about: 1) the function Θ is injective; 2) H post only depends on pivot and post-pivot queries. Formally, for all lists Q and Q and all • The implementation of oracle H is given in figure 3 .
B. Security Definition of Hash Constructions
A widely accepted approach for proving properties of hash constructions consists in assuming idealized inner-primitives (e.g. random functions) and proving that hash constructions are indistinguishable from a random function (see [8] ), which is commonly named indifferentiability from a random oracle. In our framework, this notion is formalized as a comparison between two oracle systems: one where the real hash mode is used as an overlayer of an idealized (inner) oracle system, and another where the hash construction is idealized as a random oracle and a simulator makes up for the inner system. We thus introduce a notation for idealization by uniform functions before writing our formalization for indifferentiability. We denote by RO(H) the oracle implemented as a random function on Out H using a list (mapping) L H as follows: The oracle set S in this definition is usually refered to as the simulator. It is not a stand-alone oracle system, since it requires access to RO(H) to compute its outputs.
IV. GENERIC SIMULATOR Indifferentiability proofs are difficult because one has to come up with a simulator which mimics the inner-primitives consistently despite the fact that it cannot access the list of the adversary calls to the hash oracle.
Consider for example the oracle system in Example II.1. To replace K by a random oracle and simulate F, we have to take into account that F(F(x)) = K(x) is true for any x ∈ {0, 1} n in the real setting. Hence, if an adversary queries F(x), gets y and then queries F(y), a simulator of F has to output an answer matching K(x). Otherwise, a distinguisher can perform this query and in case K(x) = F(y), claim to interact with the simulated world. Thus, the simulator should query K on x, and forward what it gets as a reply to the query F(y).
We can now extrapolate a simulation strategy. The key idea is to detect when an adversary has enough information to compute a hash value for some input x. In other words, when queried on a value q, the simulator has to determine whether and to which x the adversary can associate a hash value, given an answer for q. In case such an x is determined, the simulator queries the hash of x to get a result t. Then, it uses t to enforce that the remaining calls to the innerprimitives needed for computing the hash of x are consistent with t. Thus, the idea is to identify chains of queries that can correspond to a hash execution. Our simulator uses an algorithm which, given a list of oracle queries and a query to the pivot oracle, decides whether and for which hash input the latter is a pivot query. In case it is, this algorithm outputs a matching hash input and a list of pre-pivot queries, among the given list of queries. Such an algorithm is called a pathfinder 1 . Intuitively, it should have a non-trivial output as soon as there exists a satisfactory one, and any non-trivial output should correspond to a satisfying answer. This is captured by the following definition, where L S denotes a list variable containing all exchanges performed with the simulator so far. 
We assume that the execution time of the path-finder algorithm is bounded by a function t PathFinder (Card(L S )).
When the simulator detects a pivot query that allows to say H(x) = t, it has to impose answers to pivot and postpivot queries consistent with t. More precisely, consistency is achieved when applying H post to pivot answer and postpivot exchanges yields t. To perform this task, we introduce another algorithm: the forward sampler.
Given x and t, there is a set of lists of ex-
j=piv(x)+1 and values for y such that
j=piv(x)+1 ) = t. We denote this set by PreIm(t). Informally, a forward sampler is an algorithm that samples an element in PreIm(t) while preserving the original distribution of ((y, [v 
j=piv(x)+1 ), t). Obviously, a necessary condition for the existence of a forward sampler is that PreIm(t) is not empty. 
The implementation of the other oracles is (0, c)-bounded.
This simulator works completely independently of the fact that multiple outputs may exist from which the path-finder has to choose. However, we notice that if it is possible that the path-finder can answer two distinct hash inputs x, x for a pivot query, the simulator can only anticipate the adversary queries for one of these inputs to H. If the adversary can easily uncover such values, our simulation strategy is flawed and should yield a large indifferentiability bound, which can reflect a misconception in the hash construction or a bad choice of the pivot index.
V. THE THEOREM
Even though path-finder and forward sampler algorithms may prevent some obvious inconsistencies introduced in the idealized system, there are still cases in which they are not sufficient. Namely, when a pivot query is made to the simulator, consistency can only be enforced if, on the one hand, the path-finder can detect that it is a pivot query, and on the other hand, the pivot and post-pivot queries are still fresh, i.e., answers to these queries have not been yet generated.
A. Capturing Dependencies: Anticipating System and Characteristic Graph
We want to capture dependencies enforced in the real setting by intermediate queries (performed by H to oracles in O) in addition to direct and anticipated queries. To this end, we start by defining an intermediate system, the anticipating system O ant , which is the real system augmented with the anticipation of the post-pivot queries by oracle o piv , and visibility labels that we introduce later on. The implementations of oracles in this system can be found in figure 4 . This hybrid system, by enforcing the computation of all exchanges ever playing a role in the answer to the adversary, highlights problematic configurations.
Then, we introduce the characteristic graph, a data structure dedicated to the representation of dependencies between exchanges. Vertices of the graph are exchanges (o, q, a) computed either via a direct query or and indirect one. If an edge links two vertices, it means that they can be successive exchanges in a hash computation. To formalize that an adversary does not acquire the same knowledge of direct queries and intermediate queries necessary to the computation of a hash value, the visibility map associates vertices to visibility labels in {Inv, P V is, V is} (standing for invisible, partially visible and visible and ordered this way). Intuitively, for an interaction with the anticipating system, pre-pivot intermediate exchanges are labelled invisible, while pivot and post-pivot are deemed partially visible. Moreover, direct exchanges are considered visible, as are exchanges anticipated by the simulator.
Formally, characteristic graphs are defined as follows.
Definition V.1. A characteristic graph CG is defined by a tuple (v root , V, E, V) where:
• a root v root , • a finite set of vertices V ⊆ Xch, • a set E ⊆ (V ∪ v root ) × {0, 1} ≤r × V of labeled edges such that: 1) (o 1 , q, a) ∈ V , (v root , x 1 , (o 1 , q, a)) ∈ E implies q = H 1 (x 1 ); 2) for j ≥ 2, ((o j−1 , q, a), x j , (o j , q , a )) ∈ E implies q = H j (x j , (o j−1 ,
q, a)).
• V is a visibility map, which associates to every vertex in V a value in {Inv, P V is, V is},
• E contains all possible edges linking visible vertices: 1) for all visible vertex
The set of characteristic graphs is denoted by CG. We distinguish a particular graph CG init = (v root , [ ], ∅, V init ) with dom(V init ) = ∅ which we call the initial characteristic graph. We use the term non-visible to refer to vertices which are either partially visible or invisible. Moreover, we talk about visibility of queries: the visibility of a query (o, q) is the same as that of the (unique) vertex v in a characteristic graph such that v = (o, q, ) . Intuitively, we are interested in chains of exchanges exhibited by the characteristic graph. We thus introduce the following terminology.
• Given a graph, a path is a chain v 0 
• A meaningful path is said to be complete when L = init(x). In such cases, bitstring x is then said to label the meaningful path to which it corresponds.
B. Inconsistency Events
As foreseen previously, we face two main causes of inconsistencies. On the one hand, we can only expect that the path-finder detects pivot queries in case all pre-pivot queries have been performed before by the adversary, i.e. , in case they form up a rooted path of visible queries in the characteristic graph. On the other hand, a pivot or post-pivot query corresponding to a hash input x can be already bound to an answer at the moment when the simulator detects that it is asked a pivot query. In such a case, this latter carries on running the forward sampler, but when updating the list of queries, it stumbles upon a preexisting vertex.
As far as the characteristic graph is concerned, it means that we have to ensure three invariants: 1) no two meaningful rooted paths have a common vertex, 2) along meaningfully rooted paths, visibility labels increase, 3) no vertex creation results in linking a meaningfully rooted path with a preexisting vertex. Each time one of these invariants is broken, it corresponds to an inconsistency event, i.e. a case of bad simulation, acknowledged on the characteristic graph. However, probabilities are only defined over traces previously. As a result,
denotes the pair (y, lbl) (which is unique by construction). We denote (L, lbl) a list of exchanges consisting in L except that all visibility labels are replaced by lbl, and (L|lbl) is the restriction of list L to elements of label lbl. We now introduce inconsistency predicates (cf figure 5 -a) , mapping a graph stage to a boolean value, and formalize inconsistency events using the temporal operator "eventually". 
C. The Theorem
We can now state our theorem, according to which the indifferentiability between real and simulated systems is bounded by the probability of inconsistency events. 
Sketch of Proof.
We present a proof sketch of this theorem in CIL developed in [33] , [34] . To relate real and simulated oracle systems, we use O ant and another intermediate system FwdSpl, show indistinguishability relations between them and then use transitivity. Proof steps are outlined in figure 6 .
We have built the anticipating system O ant out of the real system by changing the implementation of the pivot oracle so that it pre-computes the exchanges that the forward sampler is meant to anticipate inside the simulator. Therefore, perfect indistinguishability of the real system (H O , O) and the anticipated system O ant follows from an argument of determinization.
The motivation behind the next step in the proof is to break the dependency existing between a hash oracle input and the matching output. We show that O ant is indistinguishable of another system, denoted FwdSpl, which is defined as follows. On a fresh input, the hash oracle resamples all prepivot exchanges (no matter their freshness), which yields a pivot query. Then, the oracle draws a hash output uniformly at random and applies FwdSplr to compute a pivot answer and post-pivot exchanges coherent with the hash output. As for the anticipating system, pre-pivot exchanges are deemed invisible and pivot and post-pivot ones partially visible.
Linking systems O ant and FwdSpl involves bisimulationup-to arguments. Informally, we prove that invisible exchanges can be resampled up to some criterion, before getting rid of the test of this criterion and replacing original code with executions of forward sampler. Conditions on the bisimulation relations can be shown to hold as soon as no inconsistency predicate is broken. As a result, we can conclude that an adversary cannot distinguish between interacting with O ant and FwdSpl with a better advantage that the probability that Reveal, Collide or Link occurs.
Finally, we justify the perfect indistinguishability between FwdSpl and (RO(H), S RO(H) ) by a determinization argument: indeed, as the hash oracle in FwdSpl computes a sequence of exchanges independent from its answer during its execution, we consider that this constitutes an anticipation of computations that system (RO(H), S RO(H) ) only performs when necessary, i.e. when o piv is called on a pivot query.
Generalization. The theorem and proof provided here are expressed for inner-primitives with random functions. Dealing with random permutations yields minor changes in the detailed proof and adds a term in the bound of the indifferentiability advantage capturing failure of injectivity as a possible bad simulation event.
VI. APPLICATIONS
Our generic theorem reminds the importance of preventing length-extension attacks. Namely, applying the theorem on the MD mode yields a bound worth 1, as length extension always allows to realize event Reveal.
In our examples of application, we do not provide implementation for a path-finder algorithm (though to obtain an instantiated bound on the execution time we should), but only specify forward sampler algorithms.
As the events F Collide , F Reveal and F Link can intersect, we take care to evaluate slightly weaker events but which partly avoid that some overlapping increases artificially the bound. The following decomposition proves useful in both examples we develop.
As there is only one possible label for an edge between two vertices, when event F Collide happens and results in the creation of a collision vertex v 2 , then it necessarily involves vertices v 0 , v 1 linked to v 2 such that v 0 = v 1 . Without loss of generality, we suppose that v 0 is created before v 1 (see figure 5 ). We denote v 1 = ( , q 1 , a 1 ) and let RootCollide capture the event that v 0 = v root and v 1 is created such that the collision happens. Then necessarily, there exist j, x 0 →2 , x 1 →2 such that H 1 (x 0 →2 ) = H j (x 1 →2 , ( , q 1 , a 1 ) ) since they both equal the query part of v 2 . Furthermore,
Figure 7. Forward Sampler Algorithm for the Sponge Example
WkCollide is verified when v 0 = v root is ( , q 0 , a 0 ), and v 1 is created; i.e. when there exist (j, 
A. The Sponge Construction
We define the forward sampler so that it parses a hash output t into k blocks of r bits and draws iteratively the c missing bits of the answers to pivot and post-pivot queries. The implementation of the forward sampler used by the simulator for the sponge construction is in figure 7 .
If F WkCollide happens at the -th fresh query then there exist (j, x 1 →2 ) and (j , x 0 →2 ) such that (F, q 0 , a 0 ) ), which imposes Last c (a 0 ) = Last c (a 1 ). Since a 1 is drawn uniformly at random, this happens with probability at most . When F RootCollide occurs, there exists v 1 such that , (F, q 1 , a 1 ) ) for some labels x 0 →2 and x 1 →2 and index j. Hence, the last c bits of a 1 to be worth 0 c . The probability that this happens is bounded by ktot 2 c . If F WkLink happens at the -th direct query creating v 1 , then there exists v 2 to which v 1 gets linked by an edge (j, x j ). With a 1 drawn uniformly at random, the probability that there is a v 2 such that H j (x j , (F, q 1 , a 1 ) . We obtain a greater bound, containing terms which are omitted in their final bound computation, as was first suggested in [25] . The missing term corresponds to the probability that length-extension attacks can be carried out, which, even though the authors propose a simulator different from ours, should not be overlooked in their computation.
B. The ChopMD Construction
We consider the hash function ChopMD introduced in [8] and inspired of [35] . The implementation of the Chop construction can be found in figure 8 . It is obtained from the Merkle-Damgård construction by chopping off the last s bits of the output in order to prevent extension attacks.
On input (x, t), we define FwdSplr to sample uniformly the s missing bits to compute the result of the pivot query y piv(x) , and outputs the concatenation of t with these bits. Probability computations are very similar to the previous case. If WkCollide happens at the -th fresh query, then the equation between v 0 and v 1 imposes a 0 = a 1 . For a random a 1 , this happens with probability less than . In turn, if F RootCollide holds, then there exist j, x 0 →2 , x 1 →2 such that H 1 (x 0 →2 ) = H j (x 1 →2 , (F, q 1 , a 1 ) . Indeed, if it happens at the -th fresh query to F, then there exists a vertex v 2 to which v 1 gets linked by an edge (j, x j ). Since answer a 1 is random, the probability that there is a v 2 such that H j (x j , (F, q 1 , a 1 )) = q 2 is bounded by −1 2 n . We conlude by summing on . Finally, when F Reveal∧¬WkLink∧¬Collide occurs, there exists a vertex v 1 = (F, q 1 , a 1 ), non-visible, which gets linked to v 2 = (F, q 2 , a 2 ), visible, by an edge labeled by (j, x j ). Again, ¬WkLink implies v 1 is created before v 2 . Since Reveal happens, H j (x j , (F, q 1 , a 1 )) = q 2 . Because of ¬Collide, there is only one satisfactory vertex v 1 . With v 1 at most partially visible, the probability that a satisfactory query q 2 is performed is bounded by 1 2 s . We then have to sum over the total number of direct queries issued, which provides a bound of ). We obtain the same bound: no meaningful path can be obtained as an extension of a meaningful path, so that Reveal can only happen when y = First n (q) belongs to an invisible vertex. As a consequence, the adversary has to guess all n bits of y and our second term becomes ) of Chang and Nandi in [23] .
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a generic reduction theorem to prove indifferentiability from a random oracle for hash constructions when their inner-primitives are modeled by random functions. In an attempt to develop a formal approach to security proofs, we have extended the framework of the logic CIL of [34] with a formalization of modes of operations -overlayers -and proven our theorem in this logic.
